How it keeps you safe

The short version: your devices do all the encrypting, our server stores what it can't open, and your apps check everything it sends back. The full details are in the protocol specification that ships with the source code.

Two secrets, one key

Your vaults are locked by a key that only your devices can work out.

  1. Your master password is never stored or sent. It is stretched with Argon2id, which makes guessing slow even on powerful hardware.
  2. Your Secret Key is 128 random bits made on your first device and kept in your Emergency Kit. Mixed with the password, it means a weak password alone can't be guessed from our data.
  3. Signing in uses OPAQUE, so the server can check you know the password without ever seeing it. Because sign-in also needs your Secret Key, nothing the server stores can be used to guess your password.
  4. Every item is encrypted with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under its vault's key, which is shared only with people you add.

What our server can and can't see

DataWhat the server holds
Passwords, notes, cards, one-time code secretsEncrypted. We can't read them.
Vault and item names, websites, usernamesEncrypted. We can't read them.
Your master password and Secret KeyNothing. They never leave your devices.
Your email addressStored, to find your account when you sign in.
Who shares a vault with whomVisible as account IDs, needed to deliver shared vaults.
How many items and changes a vault has, and whenVisible, as sizes and times of encrypted data.

If the server lies

We design for the day our server is broken into, or a rogue insider tries something. Your apps assume it might.

Signed history

Each vault change is signed by its author and chained to the last. Apps verify the whole chain and remember where they were, so missing, reordered or forked history is caught.

Public key log

Account keys are published in an append-only Merkle log. Apps check proofs on every lookup, and once a day check that no keys were added in your name.

Post-quantum encryption

Keys are exchanged with X-Wing (X25519 with ML-KEM-768) and changes are signed with Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 together, so breaking one algorithm is not enough.

Locked-down apps

The desktop app keeps keys in Rust, away from the window, which can't reach the network. The browser extension has no access to pages until you ask it to fill one.

What it can't protect against

  • Malware running on your unlocked computer can see what you see.
  • Someone who learns both your master password and your Secret Key can open your vaults.
  • Forget your master password without a recovery key or trusted contact, and your vaults are gone for good. That's the price of nobody else holding a copy of your key.
  • BlackBoxus has not been independently audited yet. Until it has, please don't rely on it alone for passwords you can't afford to lose.

Report a vulnerability

Please don't post security issues publicly. Report them privately through the GitHub repository's Security tab, using Report a vulnerability. You'll hear back within 7 days, and we credit reporters in the advisory unless they prefer not to be named. We ask for up to 90 days to release a fix before details are published.